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The quest for identity has always been a central theme in the American 
literary tradition, and in the same way fear of fragmentation has been a 
near paranoid streak in the national imagination at large. Both concerns 
can at least partly be explained in terms of the unique make-up of the 
American people, the US being truly "a nation of nations." These two 
concerns are still very much alive. The push for English as the official 
language in many states and the opposition to even remedial teaching of 
other mother tongues are indications of this. So are the struggles over 
textbooks and curricula in the nation's schools and colleges and the push 
to have school prayers - basically Protestant brands - accepted as 
standard fare in public schools again. Also, the movement to abolish 
affirmative action programs in many fields and at all levels may be seen 
as an expression of this drive to repress deviance and divisiveness and 
encourage conformity and consensus. The eternal dread of the centrifugal 
nature of their society and of a concomitant attenuation of the national 
glue - which in the end could mean the disintegration of the nation - has 
made Americans nourish a nagging suspicion of a fundamental rot from 
within, a fear that the liver of the nation is being eaten out by the 
cancerous growth of multiculturalism and diversity, the nation becoming 
a gigantic onion, a kind of multilayered cultural vegetable lacking a core. 
The pendulum swing theory has traditionally been popular among 
American historians, and a lot could be said for its validity in light of the 
implied criticism in the 1990s of the "salad bowl" image as national 
metaphor, which may be seen as an expression of a wish to return to the 
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"melting pot" days of the pre-1960s. There is a chain of causal factors 
behind this movement, beyond the traditional nostalgic yearning for 
yesterday. The erosion of the economic foundation of the middle class- 
creating resentment and a need for scapegoats and simple answers as well 
as envy towards any group enjoying a seemingly unearned privilege - is 
one domestic factor. A virtual invasion by Mexicans, especially in the 
Western states, has triggered new outbursts of nativism, even bordering 
on xenophobia. 
With the Soviet threat gone from the foreign policy scene, an import- 
ant check on racism and greed has been removed. There is no longer a 
rival power vying for influence in the colored nations of the Third World, 
which in the past provided a damper on the racism-tainted intolerance of 
"otherness" at home. At the same the advances of other nations - the 
Japanese economic miracle in particular - have sown the seeds of doubt 
about the superiority of the American system in the long run. In fact, 
many modern trends have served to shake the faith in the uniqueness of 
the American nation, its exceptionalism, which is the ideological corner- 
stone of the nation. For these and other reasons there is a deep-felt need 
to reassert basic American values, which manifests itself in a wide 
variety of ways. 
One example is the canon debate. The exchange started somewhat 
inconspicuously when William J. Bennett in his NEH Report in 1984 
coupled a return to the "classics" with the notion of "excellence" and 
called for a move "back to basics."l He was later to head the President's 
Commission on Education, which published its finding as A Nation at 
Risk.* The movement gradually picked up speed but did not really take 
off until Allan Bloom published his best-selling The Closing of the 
American Mind in 1987.3 Then the theme was picked up by several 
writers, a great number of ideological articles appearing in neo-conser- 
1 William J. Bennett, "To Reclaim a Legacy," 1984 Report on Hziiizaizities in Educatioiz, Clzroizicles of 
Higher Education (November 28, 1984), pp. 14-21. Bennett was later to become Reagan's Secretary of 
Education. 
2 US. National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The Iiizperative for Educatio~znl 
Reforill: A Report to tlze N a t i o ~  aizd the Secretaiy of Education, US Department of Educatioiz (Washington, 
D.C.: The Commission [Supt. of Docs., US G.P.O. distributor], 1983). 
3 Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and 
Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). 
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vative journals like the New Criterion and newspapers such as the Wall 
Street Journal. Also, a great number of books addressing this "problem" 
were published by political conservatives in the late 1980s and the 1990s, 
often under the auspices of right-wing ideological think tanks.4 This 
broadside attack from the Classicists or Eurocentrists was in turn met by 
a barrage of counter-attacks from the Multiculturalists, both camps 
frequently yielding to the impulse of exaggeration, distortion, and one- 
sidedness. Two combatants who present themselves as moderates, both 
allegedly seeing both sides of the issue, may illustrate the main issues of 
this debate. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., articulates his views in The 
Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society, and 
Gerald Graff, professor of English and Education at the University of 
Chicago, addresses many of the same issues in his Beyond the Culture 
Wars. 
Taking as his starting point an observation by The Economist that the 
"virus of tribalism ... risks becoming the AIDS of international politics - 
lying dormant for years, then flaring up to destroy countries," Schle- 
singer makes the divisiveness of multiculturalism the centerpiece of his 
argument. He offers Canada as a case in point, a stable nation that now is 
"on the brink of bust-up."5 Canada has "too much geography, and too 
little history." It lacks a strong national identity created around an 
American-style "E Pluribus Unum" (11). Today Americans also seem to 
have given up their historic goal of "a new race of man," which 
Cr5vecoeur rejoiced in. The escape from origins has yielded to the search 
for roots. A cult of ethnicity has arisen among non-Anglo whites and 
among non-white minorities to denounce the idea of the melting pot, the 
concept of one people. 
Schlesinger recognizes the need for acknowledging the contributions 
of cultural groups other than the WASPs - admitting that this realization 
was made at a shamefully late point in time - but claims that "the mul- 
4 For example, Dinesh D'Souza's Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus (New York: 
The Free Press, 1991) was written on a grant from the American Enterprise Institute and promoted with a 
grant from the Olin Foundation; see Gerald Graff, Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conflicts Can 
Revitalize American Education (New York: Norton, 1992), p. 166. All subsequent references to Graff's book 
in the text are to this edition. 
5 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society (New York: W. 
W. Norton Co., 1991), p. 11. All further references in the text are to this edition. 
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tiethnic dogma abandons historic purposes, replacing assimilation by 
fragmentation, integration by separatism. It belittles unum and glorifies 
pluribus" (16- 17). Consequently, the unifying idea of Americanism is 
now in peril. He claims that the educational focus on the perpetuation of 
ethnic cultures, advocated by the militants of ethnicity, "nourishes pre- 
judices, magnifies differences and stirs antagonism," which is evidenced 
by the increase in ethnic and racial conflict lying behind "the notion that 
history and literature should be taught not as intellectual disciplines but 
as therapies whose function is to raise minority self-esteem" (17). 
Whereas he endorses the Civil Rights movement and the black move- 
ment for cultural and political justice, he objects to what he perceives as 
factionalism, symbolized ultimately by the Ethnic Heritage Studies 
Programs Act of 1974, which was passed by Congress "after testimony 
from ethnic spokesmen denouncing the melting pot as a conspiracy to 
homogenize America" (43). 
To Schlesinger, the antidote to factionalism is what Gunnar Myrdal 
termed "the American Creed." In the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
"Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race and ancestry. A 
good American is one who is loyal to this country and to our creed of 
liberty and democracy" (37). Horace Kallen's call for cultural diversity in 
his 1915 essay in The Nation, entitled "Democracy versus the Melting 
Pot" was a call for cultural pluralism, not political pluralism. Kallen 
could do this, observes Schlesinger, since he took the political unity of 
the nation for granted (36-37). 
Schlesinger makes no bones about the fact that the white settlers of the 
United States stole the land from the natives and sequestered their tribes, 
brought Africans to America to work as slaves on plantations, and 
Chinese to build their railroads, at the same time that they "enunciated- 
glittering generalities of freedom and withheld them from people of 
color" (39). However, despite these grim realities, says Schlesinger, what 
James Bryce called the "amazing solvent power" of American ideas and 
institutions held sway (39). Schlesinger goes on to characterize the ethnic 
movement as an elitist fad encouraged by ethnic leaders - intellectuals, 
academics, and businessmen - with considerable vested interests in the 
maintenance of ethnic traditions. At the same time Schlesinger admits 
that American history by and large has been written by (and about) white 
Anglo-Saxon males with their special prejudices and slanted views of the 
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nation's history. Therefore, Schlesinger is sympathetic towards the 
development, as a cultural necessity, of what he calls the "there's-always- 
a-black-man-at-the bottom-of-it-doing-the-real-work approach" to Am- 
erican history; this kind of "contribution history" is a natural phase of any 
ethnic group's building of self-pride, identity, and integrity, as a formula- 
tion of their claim to America (61). However, he is critical of what he 
perceives as Afrocentric excesses, such as the teachings of Leonard Jeff- 
ries and the "Afrocentric" program of Asa Hillard called "African- 
American Baseline Essays," which he labels a "history as weapon" 
approach (67-68).6 He argues that Afrocentric curricula will hamper the 
black child's progress in American society, pointing to developments in 
colleges and universities where black students who do not participate in 
black activities feel that they are shunned as "sell-outs" to the white 
world. This trend has been documented by anthropologist Signithia 
Fordham of Rutgers University, who found that one important reason for 
black under-achievement was "a kind of cultural orientation which 
defines academic learning in school as 'acting white"' (105). The "tribal- 
ization" of the black community, then, may be conducive to both anti- 
intellectualism and academic parochialism. 
One of Schlesinger's main points of criticism of this "tribalism" con- 
cerns the giving up of fundamental American values such as individual- 
ism and freedom of speech for group loyalty. The American liberal tradi- 
tion is based on such fundamental values, the freedom of the individual 
being perhaps the most basic of all. The growth of "thought police" 
tendencies on many campuses - in various forms of "political correct- 
ness" - is an un-American development, which breeds tension and intol- 
erance, he claims, quoting a University of Pennsylvania professor stating 
that individualism is a "red flag phrase today, which is considered by 
many to be racist" (117). Offering Mario Cuomo as an example - an 
immigrant child speaking no English till the age of eight - Schlesinger 
claims that "[m]onolingual education opens doors to the larger world 
(log), a somewhat curious statement in an international context, but 
perhaps symptomatic of Schlesinger's brand of Americanism, rife with 
exceptionalist overtones. At the same time, however, he derides what he 
6 Leonard Jeffrles speaks of "Ice people" (Eulopeans) and "sun people" (Afrncans) and clalms that "ilch 
Jews" financed the slave trade, on thls basls he advocates dramatlc revlslons of curricula, see Schlesmgel, pp 
67-68 
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calls panicky conservatives calling for an amendment making English 
the official language of the United States, since he believes such a 
measure would only increase racial discrimination and resentment. 
English should need no such artificial measure in its support. Nonethe- 
less, he rejects bilingualism as elitist "romantic ethnicity," as he does po- 
litical ethnicity. Institutional bilingualism would be another source of 
fragmentation fired by excessive ethnic identifi~ation.~ 
Gerald Graff begins his book, Beyond the Culture Wars: How the 
Teaching of Conflicts Can Revitalize American Education, on a different 
note: 
If we believe what we have been reading lately, American higher education is in a 
disastrous state. As pictured in a stream of best sellers, commission reports, polemical 
articles, and editorials, the academic humanities in particular look like a once- 
respectable old neighborhood gone b d .  The stately old buildings have been defaced 
with spray paint, hideous accumulations of trash litter the ground, and omnipresent 
thought police control the turf, spealung in barbarous, unintelligible tongues while 
enforcing an intolerant code of political correctness on the terrorized inhabitants. (3) 
Graff finds that there is "something truly astonishing about the degree of 
exaggeration, patent falsehood, and plain hysteria attained by the more 
prominent of these accounts." Much of the hysteria comes from a simple 
fear of change, he claims, but much of it he attributes to the mysterious 
nature of certain precincts of the academic world to both other academics 
and the public. He himself started his academic career in 1959, when the 
literary canon seemed so uncontroversial that one rarely heard the word 
"canon," he observes. That the university today "is rocked by unpreced- 
ented conflicts is a measure of its vitality, not its decline," he opines, 
seeing the academic challenge in the present situation as one of "trans- 
forming a scene of hatred and anger into one of educationally productive 
debate" (4). 
He thinks that there is little reason to believe that Americans today are 
less divided by class than other nations, but they are better at concealing 
them than other nations, in that a combination of geography and afflu- 
7 Note that the Bilingual Edncation Act of 1968 has been steadily weakened. It was a typical product of the 
1960s in that it secured initial teaching in the mother tongue to minority groups, provided those students 
constituted a sufficient number in a school district. The Supreme Court upheld this right in Lau v. Nichols in 
1973. However, since then this right has been steadily watered down and circumvented. 
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ence has enabled more fortunate Americans to avoid noticing unpleasant 
social conflict by simply moving away from them in the tradition of the 
frontier philosophy: 
Yet one would never guess from the overheated and ill-informed accounts given by 
today's popular critics that the issues in the battle over education are ones on which 
reasonable people might legitimately disagree. Arguments that at the very least are 
worthy of debate - like the argument that political factors such as race, class, gender, 
and nationality have influenced art and criticism far more than education has 
traditionally acknowledged - have been reduced by their opponents to their crudest and 
most strident form and thus dismissed without a hearing .... A complex set of issues that 
cry out for serious debate has been turned into a clear-cut choice - as one prominent 
conservative puts it - "between culture and barbarism" (4-5).8 
He goes on to charge that many of the stories about intolerant political 
correctness on campus - when they have not been shown to be bogus - 
seem to be "a symptom not of left-wing McCarthyism ... but of fear to 
face controversy." 
The alarm that the traditional canon was being tossed out - first 
sounded by William J. Bennett, and later by Allan Bloom - was repeated 
frequently in similar articles in papers like the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Chicago Tribune, and a 
host of other publications, mostly on the political right, such as the New 
Criterion and Commentary. It is also a centerpiece of Dinesh D'Souza's 
best-seller from 1991, Illiberal Education (incidentally one of Schle- 
singer's major sources of information), which asks pointedly: "Why are 
universities expelling Homer, Aristotle, Shakespeare, and other 'white 
males' from their required reading list?"g Graff has checked the accuracy 
of this claim. A case in point is a remark made by Christopher Clausen, 
head of the English Department at Penn State, in an article entitled "It Is 
Not Elitist to Place Major Literature at the Center of the English 
Curriculum"; Clausen said he was willing to "bet that [Alice Walker's] 
The Color Purple is taught in more English courses today than all of 
Shakespeare's plays combined."1° Graff provides evidence to the con- 
8 Graff is quoting Roger Kimball, "Tenured Radicals: A Postscript," New Criterion 9: no. 5 (January 1991), 
p. 13. 
9 D'Souza, p. 20. 
10 Christopher Clausen, "It Is Not Elitist to Place Major Literature at the Center of the English 
Curriculum," Chronicle of Higher Education (Jan. 13, 1988), pp. 14-21. 
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trary, but says that, nonetheless, the "Color Purple remark ha[s] become 
Exhibit A in a trumped-up charge of canonicide in the national press." He 
also revisits many of the other "horror stories" paraded in the media and 
furnishes substantial evidence for his claim that these stories are greatly 
exaggerated.ll 
However, Graff's main objective, he states, is not primarily to furnish 
polemical rejoinders, but to argue his own philosophy that reading lists 
revised in light of modern needs - including traditional "Great Books" as 
well as works representing other traditions than white, Western main- 
stream literature - may provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
both the classics and the students' own identity as modern Americans. As 
a case in point he gives an account of how he has taught Joseph Conrad's 
novel The Heart of Darkness since the 1950s, first in the traditional way 
- informed by the standard critics - and recently in tandem with Chinua 
Achebe's essay "An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad's Heart of 
Darkness," which he maintains has added a totally new dimension to his 
teaching and to his students' appreciation of the novel (26-27). 
At this point in his discussion he brings in the question of standards of 
excellence. In the 1960s and 1970s militant black critics such as Addison 
Gayle, Jr., criticized the monopolistic use of a "lily-white yardstick" for 
literary and art criticism and advocated the need for a "Black Aesthetic." 
Graff wants to move beyond this type of polarization; his "teaching the 
politics of Heart of Darkness," as he puts it, is an attempt to strike a bal- 
ance based on a more inclusive approach. To him a broadening of the 
curricula would be a desirable move. He dismisses as "absurd" the ex- 
tremist Leonard Jeffries' pronouncements regarding "ice people" and the 
like, and the insistence that only blacks can teach black history and 
literature. In contrast, Graff gives his own recipe on "How to Save Dover 
Beach," that is revitalizing "the classics" by using new approaches to 
make them accessible to new groups of students (37-41). 
William Bennett subtitled his book "Improving America's Schools and 
Affirming the Common Culture." Graff takes issue with Bennett and 
Schlesinger when they call for a return to the teaching of the "common 
11 For a thorough mapping and documentation of the real state of affairs and the polemical campaign 
against multiculturalism see John K. Wilson, The Myth of Political Correctness: The Conservative Attack on 
Higher Education (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). Wilson by and large supports Graff's claims. 




because their perception of that culture is static, a given univer- 
: people just 'affirm' or don't affirm rather than something people 
to create through democratic discussion": 
Bennett fails to make the crucial distinction between a coinlnon culture based on 
agreement about questions like the meaning and value of "Dover Beach" and a com- 
mon discussion about culture, which implies agreement only to debate our different 
beliefs, tastes, and values, with the help of whatever cominon language, assuinptions, 
and conclusions we are able to discover through the process of discussion itself. For 
there is always a background of agreement that inaltes disagreement possible, and 
through debate that area of agreement can be widened. We need to distinguisli between 
a shared body of national beliefs, which democracies can do nicely without, and a 
common national debate about our many differences, which we now need more than 
ever. (45) 
In his defense of multiculturalism, Graff charges that the mass media - 
far from being the liberal bastions they are alleged to be by conservative 
critics - are very biased in favor of the mainstream tradition. Not only are 
unrepresentative horror stories reduplicated exponentially, as already 
mentioned, but such stories are grasped eagerly by journalists who resist 
grappling with the more complex undergrowth of causal factors behind 
these stories. Not only is a comprehensive approach to such subjects 
more demanding, but it may easily cloud the issues and spoil simplistic, 
but catchy and striking headlines, Graff contends. 
Graff sees the recirculation of these stories and the attack on mul- 
ticulturalism as a reflection of the larger conservative academic cam- 
paign illustrated by the growth of conservative think tanks such as the 
American Enterprise Institute, the Hudson Institute, and the Olin 
Foundation with its beneficiary, the National Association of Scholars, 
which funds a chain of conservative campus newspapers. He no doubt 
has a valid point. Organizations like the Olin Foundation make no secret 
of their determination to roll back gains made through affirmative action, 
for instance, and returning education to "traditional values," yet this 
agenda and its formidable financial backing have by and large escaped 
the general label of "politicization" that the press attaches to its targets of 
criticism, Graff charges (167). 
This brief sojourn into the canonical debate should suffice to illustrate 
the polemical nature of the exchange. At this point I will turn to the field 
of law. The Supreme Court has played a greater role than Congress in the 
THE U.S.A. IN THE 1990s: MONOLITH OR MOSAIC 25 
struggle over multiculturalism and mainstream-minority relations in the 
last two generations. In the same way that the debate over university 
curricula is split between conservatives, who argue for the status quo or 
even a return to the alleged apolitical syllabi of yesteryear, and liberals, 
who argue for a revision of the canon, the legal field is divided between 
strict and loose constructionists, who basically group themselves along 
similar ideological dividing lines. Strict constructionists, who claim to 
read the law narrowly, are often said to show judicial restraint, whereas 
loose constructionists, or interpretivists, are seen as judicial activists. 
In Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) the Court voided as unreasonable a 
Nebraska law which barred the teaching of the German language before 
the students reached the eighth grade.12 The Court made it clear that 
xenophobia did not have the sanction of the law. However, immigration 
laws passed from then on became increasingly restrictive as the number 
of immigrants increased and their geographical origins changed. From 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 to the National Origins Act of 1924 
the controlling principle behind the laws was selection rather than mere 
restriction. The word un-American became commonplace during World 
War I, and the term did not only imply national security risks, but was 
tagged on to anything that seemed "incompatible with American values." 
It was the piecemeal incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, gradually making the Bill 
of Rights applicable to the states that started the expansion of constitu- 
tional protection to embrace groups and fields that had hitherto fallen 
outside its reach. But it was the special scrutiny regarding fundamental 
rights and "discrete and insular minorities," beginning with Justice 
Harlan Stone's famed "Footnote Four" in a 1938 decision, that afforded 
substantive rights to special minority groups.13 Beginning with that pro- 
verbial "switch," substantive due process as a legal principle was trans- 
ferred from the economic sphere to the field of civil rights and was to 
serve as a basis for the judicial civil rights revolution of the 1950s and 
1960s, under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren. Increasingly 
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment took over as 
12 262 US. 390 (1923). 
13 US v. Carolene Products Co., 304 US. 144 (1938). 
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the most important legal basis for socio-legal reform as equality was 
given a new content under Warren's judicial reign. 
By this time race and nationality had been found to be "suspect 
classifications" which must be subject to "strict scrutiny" and (which) 
could only be condoned upon showing of a "compelling governmental 
interest."14 The landmark turn of the tide was the Court's unanimous 
decision in the school desegregation cases in 1954, of which Brown v. 
Board of Education is the best known. Here the Court found that 
segregation as such was "inherently unequal" and consequently invalid- 
ated the principle of "separate but equal." 
The massive Southern sabotage of the implementation of this decision 
is a well-known story - with "too much deliberation and too little speed," 
in the words of the Court later15 - and so are the infamous but ubiquitous 
bumper stickers traveling throughout the Southern states, carrying the 
slogan "Impeach Earl Warren." But it was by the consistent line of 
decisions by the Supreme Court and by the courageous action of 
numerous US District and Appeals Court judges (many appointed by 
Dwight Eisenhower) that the advances of civil rights for black Amer- 
icans, particularly in the South, were carried out. And in consequence, 
civil right groups came to rely on the judicial branch of government for 
redress of grievances, rather than on the legislative and executive 
branches. 
This led to a rechanneling of energies among civil rights groups, which 
in turn spread to other interest and activist groups and produced a 
litigation orientation and a new focus on group membership; the class 
action suit became an effective tool for settling disputes. And contrary to 
popular notions, the legacy of the Warren Court was by and large carried 
on by the Burger Court in the 1970s. The extension of women's rights is 
a case in point, the Roe v. Wade decision of 1973 establishing the right of 
abortion being the most monumental. The political implementation of 
14 Pivotal points in this legal evolution are "the rational basis" standard launched in Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 US 61 at 78-79 (1911); Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's famous "Footnote Four," 
introducing the "strict scrutiny" standard ("more searching judicial inquiry") to deal with classifications 
involving "discrete and insular minorities"; Korematsu v. US (1944), finding racial classifications 
"immediately suspect," 323 US 214 at 216 (1944); and Loving v. Virginia (1967), declaring racial 
classifications "inherently suspect," 388 US. 1 at 12. 
15 377 US. at 231, 1964. 
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cultural pluralism reached its peak in the Democratic nomination for the 
1972 presidential election, where the apportionment according to group 
strength was carried to an all time high. Representative democracy had 
reached its zenith. This, however, helped bring the party to its nadir in 
electoral strength in the following general election. In presidential 
politics this produced a shift away from the interest group model, but in 
the judicial branch a built-in inertia kept the principle active well into the 
1980s. 
Affirmative action was a conspicuous illustration of the new meaning 
of the "equal protection of the laws" clause in the Constitution. To make 
up for past discrimination and provide equal opportunities, the govern- 
ment was to assist in levelling the playing field. In 1965 President 
Johnson issued Executive Order 11246 to implement this principle in 
government contracting, based on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which for- 
bade discrimination in the workplace, in educational institutions receiv- 
ing government money, and elsewhere. President Nixon followed up, 
asking his Secretary of Labor, George Schultz, to develop a com- 
prehensive plan for integrating the building industries in Philadelphia, 
Cleveland, St. Louis, and some other straggling cities. Soon claims of 
"reverse discrimination" were heard, mainly from disgruntled white 
males, and the courts took over. The first case proper to reach the Su- 
preme Court was the famous Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke (1978), in which the white applicant Allan Bakke claimed that he 
had been discriminated against by admission officials on account of his 
race. The Court agreed that the rigid quota used by the University of 
California was unconstitutional, but accepted race as one factor among 
several to be taken into consideration when considering college ap- 
plicants. Since then there have been about a dozen affirmative action 
cases proper before the Supreme Court, and progressively the concept 
has been redefined and delimited. 
In the 1990s the conservative majority of the Court has all but 
abandoned the principle, the decision in Adarand v. Pena (1995) 
removing the special privilege and obligation that the federal government 
up to that time had retained to provide benign affirmative action. 
However, in several cases the Court majority in the 1980s made it clear 
that affirmative action was broader than the Reagan Administration's 
narrow understanding of the concept as merely compensation for con- 
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Crete cases of proven discrimination. In Wjgant v. Jackson Board of 
Education (1986), the Court said: "As part of this nation's dedication to 
eradication of racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon 
to bear some of the burden of the remedy."16 In effect, the Court said that 
no American was totally innocent in this matter. The succeeding year the 
Court held that blatant statistical imbalances in gender distribution in 
jobs sufficed as basis for affirmative action programs for women.17 
Also in other civil rights areas, school districting and reapportionment 
of election districts cases in particular, the Court played an activist role in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Again, these actions have come to a halt more or 
less by the mid-1990s.18 It is interesting to see the opposition to the 
activist role of the Court in all of these three areas as well as the 
Constitutional interpretation advanced by the involved groups. In Plessy 
v. Ferguson (1896), Justice John Marshall Harlan was the lone dissenter 
on the Court that handed down the "separate but equal" decision. He 
argued: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among  citizen^."^^ The same constellation of groups and 
individuals who fervently opposed his view then, was equally militant in 
its opposition to the Warren Court's decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954), which advocated the color-blind approach. It is 
therefore interesting to see how adamantly the same groups are now 
parading the colorless principle, using as their main argument Harlan's 
very words, "the constitution is color-blind," arguing now, at variance' 
with their previous position, that any kind of different treatment is dis- 
criminatory the distinction between "benign" or "ameliorative" discrim- 
ination on the one hand and "invidious" or "malignant" discrimination on 
the other is not considered valid. The negative effects of affirmative 
action - unfair to groups not included and harmful to the self-image of 
members of favored groups - are vehemently articulated in the nation's 
media. However, affirmative action programs for military veterans - 
which have been in force since World War I (and in some degree since the 
Civil War) - and preferential treatment of the sons and daughters of 
16 476 US. 267 at 280-281 (1986). 
17 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Siznta Clara, Cal., 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987) 
18 See Shaw v. Reno (1993, 1995); Jenluns v. Missouri (1995); Miller v. Johnson (1995); Bush v. Vera 
(1996); Holder v. Hall (1994). 
19 163 US. 537 at 559, 1896. 
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alumni at the nation's most prestigious universities - of equally long 
standing - are not seen to have similar consequences. 
There is an old saying that in the US one has socialism for the rich and 
free enterprise for the poor. There is more than a grain of truth to this 
saying. Economic subsidies to corporations and wealthy property owners 
are in good standing, whereas poverty has never been granted status as a 
"suspect classification" and entitled to "strict scrutiny," nor has the 
freedom from want been guaranteed as a fundameqtal right. Sympto- 
matically, today the anti-entitlement drive is aimed against the socio- 
economic underdog, who more often than not is a nonwhite person. 
Today the US is moving at a rapid pace towards the "two-thirds" society, 
where one-third is falling outside the social safety net and where race is a 
central factor. Gunnar Myrdal's designation "An American Dilemma" - 
ostensibly about the country's racial problem, but fundamentally about 
the discrepancy between the nation's ideals and its realities - is being 
realized in a disconcerting manner, all the while accompanied by the 
rhetoric of the color-blind ideal. In its report on the causes of the urban 
unrest in the northern cities during the long, hot summer of 1967, the 
Kerner Commission spoke of the two-dimensional American big cities: a 
wealthy ring of affluent suburbs around a core of poor, dilapidated 
central city: "This is our basic conclusion: Our nation is moving toward 
two societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal."20 This devel- 
opment has not been checked. On the contrary, it has accelerated over the 
years. In addition, the ethnic revival and the rise of special interest 
groups, not only in economic terms but within the fields of ethnicity and 
culture, have served to complicate the picture. 
At this point in history, then, is the US a monolith or a mosaic? The 
answer is not simple, but may run something like this: Although 
sometimes resembling the latter, upon closer scrutiny it seems more like 
a broken mirror, reflecting a fragmentary image of its one-time ideal. 
20 "Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civll Disorders: Summary of Report," in Albert P. 
Blaustein et al., eds., Civil Rights and the American Negro: A Docu~nentary History (New York: Washington 
Square Press, 19681, p. 619. 
